Viewing All Flashcards for Philosophy: Justice and Contemporary Ethics
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A claim that realists make:
States always act only for reasons of self-interest...
...so any military intervention undertaken for professed humanitarian reasons must be driven by a hidden agenda of self-interest.
Mill’s reason: the only people suited to have freedom & democracy under a domestic ruler are those who value freedom enough to fight for it and win.
Walzer’s “Domestic Analogy” (Just & Unjust Wars p. 58)
• The rules governing how we deal with aggression between states should be understood on a model of rules for preserving civil order among individuals.
• There is a “society of states”.
• Like individuals, states are capable of: (a) Committing crimes against other states. (b) Engaging in self-defense. (c) Enforcing the (international) law. (d) Punishing lawbreakers.
The domestic analogy supports “The Legalist Paradigm” for dealing with inter-state aggression.
Key features of the legalist paradigm (pp. 61-63):
(a) There is an international society made up of independent states... (but not of individual men and women)
(b) “Any use of force...by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.”
(c) Aggression by state X can justify war against X
(d) Nothing else can justify war: • Religious or political differences with X cannot justify war. • Domestic injustice by X cannot justify war against X.
According to universalist liberals:
(a) There are human rights that are possessed by all human beings
E.g. free speech, no arbitrary imprisonment, right to trial, practice the religion of one’s choice, etc.
(b) States rights are subordinate to human rights:
“Neither the group nor the nation nor the state can be seen as possessing inherent rights. The rights [states] claim derive from individuals. When [states] define their rights and duties in a way that tramples the basic rights of individuals
they forfeit their legitimacy.”
1.Where the national boundaries already contains two politically distinct communities, one of which is already engaged in a large-scale war of secession;
2.Counter-intervention where a foreign power has already crossed the nation’s borders (even if it has done so at the behest of one side of a civil war); and
3.When the violation of human rights within the boundary are so terrible as to make talk of ‘arduous struggle’ seem cynical and irrelevant – e.g. mass enslavement or massacre.
Not enough that there is some appeal to independence or self- determination by a group (p93);◦ Absolutely crucial that there already be a politically distinctcommunity – consequently there must first be a sustained political or military struggle for independence before intervention is permissible◦ Note the difference between the forming of a separate politicalcommunity and a dispute between different portions of the samecommunity. Not enough to simply say that a large number ofpeople oppose their government.◦ Walzer also notes obligation to weigh intervention againstprudence, both of one’s own peoples’ interests and of international stability.
Walzer examines this primarily in the context of civil war, where one side has already obtained the backing of a foreign power;◦ General principle against intervention in civil war: undermines national self-determination.◦ Intervention is only justified to the point of balancing the wrongful imposition: without the distortion of foreign backing, self-help is the test for legitimacy of the new government.◦ Note Walzer’s example of South Vietnam following its refusal to hold free elections.
Note the high requirements for intervention here: essentially restricted to mass killings or effective enslavement, of such a kind that to allow the local balance to play out is not self-determination in any meaningful sense.◦ Note Walzer’s caution: numerous horrors that would qualify, but very difficult to identify ones that have resulted in a true humanitarian intervention.◦ Not necessary that the intervention be motivated solely byaltruism (Walzer: nations don’t put their soldiers in harms way for solely humanitarian purposes). But need to consider the implications of mixed motives for self- determination. C/f Cuban intervention in 1898 v Bangladesh intervention in 1971.
ς Come up with a definition of terrorism conducive to showing that it is always wrong (relatively easy); Come up with a definition of Just War that always excludes terrorism (not so easy).
ς Defines terrorism as requiring: 1. Acts of serious violence; 2. A motivating political goal;3. Must target limited numbers of people in order to influence a much wider array of ordinary people and/or policy makers;4. Must intentionally kill and injure innocent people; Why is terrorism wrong?◦ Argues features 1-3 don’t distinguish it from other acts of war. Hence 4 is most plausible.
12)
By itself, JWT is just a set of criteria for a just war. Only implies that war is THEORETICALLY justifiable – doesn’t logically imply that the criteria can actually be met.
◦ Traditionally, JWT restricts just war to national defence and (highly limited – e.g. see Walzer) DEFENCE of others, while excluding the targeting of civilians.
◦ Traditional model DOESN'T COMPLETELY EXCLUDE killing of civilians (e.g. some leeway for unintended but foreseeable killing)
Claim: Despite public pretences, all governments are there to pursue their national interest, and will do whatever it takes to maximise that interest. Limits on war exist only for mutual benefit or to avoid harm to national interest through poor public morale / foreign perceptions.◦ Leaves no room for criticising anything in the pursuit of political ends, much less exclude terrorism!
Claim: we should act in accordance with the set of moral beliefs upon which there is widely shared consensus.◦ Problem: common-sense morality has in past occasions supported a ‘do what it takes to win’ mentality – or, at the least, ‘do what it takes to minimise our own nation’s losses’. Gives the example of Stimson’s (US Secretary of War in WW2) defence of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on common moralgrounds rather than realpolitik. Stimson professed a duty to do whatever would end the war with the least harm to US and alliedsoldiers. The nuclear bombing of Japan was a massive attack on civilians for the purpose of influencing the Japanese leadership (could make a similar argument for Allied firebombing of Dresden)– meets all of the criteria for a terrorist act.
Claim: basic requirement of not attacking civilians, except in extreme emergency (Walzer supports the morality of the early-wartime bombings of German and Japanese cities, while criticising the later attacks on Dresden, Hiroshima, etc.)◦ Problem: vagueness of ‘supreme emergency’ – has not only been used to justify extraordinary loss of civil liberties, torture and indefinite detention post-9/11, but there is also a likelihood of it characterising the mindset underlying terrorist attacks.
Claim: must never target civilians.◦ Doesn’t absolutely forbid killing of civilians – e.g. unintended but foreseeable deaths.◦ Problem: the 9/11 attacks themselves targeted a mixed government/civilian building. Implies that the attack would be justifiable so long as it was only intended as a national infrastructure attack, even though the civilian deaths were foreseeable.
17)
ς Need to measure terrorism by the degree of active effort taken to avoid civilian deaths, not just avoid targeting civilians. May require undertaking deliberately more risky strategies: low-flying attacks rather than high-altitude bombings, infantry rather than drones, etc. Must ‘bend over backwards’ to avoid civilian deaths.
ς Wars both cause and exacerbate famine; Economic policy contributes...but mainly: The money spent by first world governments on comparative trivialities vastly exceeds the amount needed to provide food, shelter and medicine. No signs of popular outrage at this policy.
ς ‘duty’: is part of our basic moral obligations. We do something morally wrong by omitting it. ‘charity’: we do something morally good by acting on it, but do nothing morally wrong if we don’t do it.Could express a 3rd kind (Kant): one where we do something morally wrong if we don’t do it enough, but there is no sole occasion were we are morally obliged to do it)
Singer’s argument: to give much of our financial worth to 3rd world poverty is a moral obligation or duty - we act immorally if we don’t do so.
ς Singer’s Claim 1: “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” (231)
E.g. Say that on your way to work you walk past a shallow pond in which a small child is drowning:
Saving the child will inconvenience you - muddy your clothes and make you late to work.
The child is not dying due to any action of yours – only inaction at worst.
It doesn’t seem like it should matter whether the child is your neighbour’s, or a tourist from Bengali – so proximity doesn’t seem to be a deciding issue.
Doesn’t seem relevant whether you are the only one there, compared to whether there are hundreds of passers-by ignoring the drowning child
Seems obvious that saving the child is not just charitable, but morally obligatory. So if proximity, numbers, causation etc aren’t relevant, then why shouldn’t we have the same obligation to children dying of starvation?
PB: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.SB: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
P1. If you donate N% of your income to famine relief, then you would prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, & meds.
P2. If you donate N% of your income to famine relief, then you would not be sacrificing anything of moral significance.
P3. Principles PB and SB are both true.
C. You morally ought to donate N% of your income to famine relief.Fallacious: Does not lead to ‘C: I should give $5’ – P1 is purely hypothetical. Nothing in P1 says that anyone will actually give $5
Obj. 1: Famine sufferers are far away. (addressed on p. 232)Obj. 2: Other people who could help aren’t helping; why should I?(addressed on p. 232-233)Obj. 3: This conclusion clashes too much with commonsense moral thinking; there must have been an error.(addressed on p 238-239. ) Obj. 4: Foreign aid is the government’sresponsibility, not mine. (addressed on p. 239-240)
24)
Rich nations morally ought not to send aid to poor countries experiencing famine.
(I) The lifeboat analogy (II) The “moral hazard” argument. (III) Overpopulation argument.
ς Hardin argues that ‘environmentalists’ view the Earth in terms akin to a spaceship: a floating mass in which we all share the resources required for life, so that no one person has the right to destroy, waste or use more than her fair share of resources (378)
But a real spaceship couldn’t survive in that manner – it would need a captain to make allocation decisions. The UN doesn’t come close to filling such a role.
Instead, we should view the earth as a lifeboat: keeping a lucky few above the water (with food and first world conditions), the rest outside drowning, and only a limited room onboard (i.e. limited resources that can only support a certain population, which we might have already surpassed)
(1) Each rich nation is like a lifeboat, full of rich people.(2) Those in poor nations are like those swimming in the ocean,trying to get in to the lifeboat. (3) The lifeboat can fit 60 people.(4) There are 50 people already aboard. (5) But 100 people outside.What should we (in the lifeboat) do?
P1. We are morally obligated not to let anyone else board our lifeboat.P2. If P1 is true, then we are morally obligated not to provide famine relief to people living in poor countries (or allow a net positive migration + population growth in rich countries, depending on how we interpret the analogy).C. We are morally obligated not to provide famine relief to people living in poor countries.
Hardin identifies a form of ‘tragedy of the commons’
“If [the food bank] is open to every country every time a need develops, slovenly rulers will not be motivated
[to save resources for lean years]...
“The poor countries will not learn to mend their ways, and will suffer progressively greater emergencies as their populations grow.”
Hardin argues that a similar problem arises in relation to the numerous shared earth resources: fisheries, cross-border environmental damage, pollution of air and water, etc.
If true, then attempts at conservation are doomed unless a framework of legal control, OR property-like incentive/responsibility can be implemented.
If poor countries receive no food from the outsidethe rate of their population growth would be periodicallychecked by crop failure and famines.“But if [poor countries] can always draw on a world food bank in time of need, their population can continue togrowunchecked,andsowilltheir“need”foraid.“In the short run, a world food bank may diminish that need, but in the long run it actually increases the need without limit.”
ς Hardin makes a point of noting that he doesn’t view any of this as providing genuine justice (383). Rather, he sees such justice as requiring a true world government to overcome ‘tragedy of the commons’-style problems, with the authority and efficiency to regulate resource use (maybe population, though he doesn’t specify it) at a global level. In the absence of such a solution, he sees us stuck in the lifeboat.
He doesn’t seem to view increased food production, and hence increased human survival, as necessarily a good thing (see 381): compares human overpopulation to a cancer upon the Earth’s environment, quoting Gregg in noting that cancers require food, but are never cured by it.
Major sub-field of applied ethics;• Has particular importance to political philosophy, but is not confined to that.• Is the philosophy of how to determine the fairest or most just way of distributing a limited resource.• Often refers to physical resources (e.g. Rawls v Nozick on redistribution of income) but can also include intangible resources, like political power, immigration and citizen rights: anything where there is a moral question about the distribution of limited goods to multiple deserving parties.• Not the same thing as asking whether someone, as an individual, ‘deserves’ to have a share – ideally, everyone would have financial, political and residential security.
(1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees p.14)“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee”shall apply to any person who......owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country...”
Pole 1: Ex Gratia. There is no strong moral requirement to allow refugees membership in one’s community.Pole 2: Open Borders.
We have no special right to restrict other people’s freedom of movement;
if outsiders want to move to this region and participate in this community, we have no right to stop them.
People outside the shelter will suffer greatly from the radiation. There will be high mortality, and life will be utterly miserable.
• The fallout shelter was designed to hold and supply 10,000 people for 20 years. (The 10,000 are people who bought shares – i.e. they sacrificed immediate expenditure so that they could buy these shares for later).
• The radiation levels will be back to normal in only 10 years. So they have twice as many supplies as necessary.
• They could save another 10,000 people outside (some of these would be freeloaders – but assume that few people had such forsight.
• To do this, they will need to convert all luxury spaces (e.g. gymnasiums & swimming pools), and limit all luxury foods.
BUT they could admit a smaller number – 500 outsiders – with almost no sacrifice to living conditions at all. Again, some would be freeloaders.
P1. The bleeding heart policy in the shelter is morally obligatory.P2. If P1 is true, then affluent countriesshould be admitting many morerefugees than they currently admit.C. Affluent countries should be admitting many more refugees than they currently admit.
• If an outsider’s interest in joining our community is greater than our collective interest in excluding her, then we are morally obligated to take her in.
1. Within the terms of Singer’s example:– is there anything that might affect a person’s moral claim to membership?– Does it change things if we assume that everybody was given sound evidence 20 years ago that such a shelter would be needed in the future– How about if people were told 20 years ago, but the evidence was marginal at best (nonetheless, those inside still built the shelter themselves, whereas those outside did not)?– What about successive generations – the children of those who decided not to take part in building the shelter?2. Outside the terms of Singer’s example:– Is there anything relevant about state boundaries that Singer omits from his fallout shelter example?– Let’s assume that there is enough spare capacity to take in 50,000 people without sacrificing anything. But the 10,000 people who built the shelter were members of a culturally or religiously persecuted group on the verge of disappearance. Are they then obliged to let in the 50,000?
It shares many of the same complicating factors as the puzzle it endeavours to resolve, without making the ‘right’ answer more obvious;
• May be worth considering whether it relies upon our adopting Singer’s moral calculus in any event (or else it turns upon community obligations and unequal considerations that have no place in Singer’s moral reasoning)
Where the interests of different parties conflict, we [should] attempt to give equal consideration to all interests, which would mean that more pressing and more fundamental interests take precedence over those less pressing or fundamental.”(Singer & Singer 1988: 121).Could be given EITHER a utilitarian OR a Kantian basis: • utilitarianism: all sources of happiness are equally important; • Kantian: might not be able to consistently will that one’s fundamental interests be sacrificed for another’s luxuries, OR might insist on social structures that do not use one as a means towards another’s luxurious ends.
For, whereas all developed nations safeguard the welfare of their residents in many ways... ...refugees receive none of these benefits unless they are accepted into the country.Since the overwhelming majority of [refugees] arethe overwhelming majority will not receive these benefits on the grounds that they arenot residents of the countries that provide them to residents.But is this distinction in the way in which we treat residents and nonresidents compatible with our professed belief in the equality of all human beings?”
Equal consideration of happiness? (hence applies regardless of membership – also overrides those who want to prioritise things other than happiness)– Absence of political discrimination? (might count against non-members so long as the membership criteria aren’t discriminatory – e.g. rolling dice)– Equality before the law? (can insist on the application of law, with no guarantee that the law itself won’t favour particulargroups);– Equal respect for persons? (respect for rational decision- making, including the creation, buying and disposal of property, including via sale and dying estates – leading to different allocations of property and group membership)
P1. If we implement an open borders state then smaller political units will become more exclusive.
P2. Having open borders state with exclusive local political entities is worse than the status quo.
C. Having an open borders state is worse than the status quo.
New York city and Ancient Alexandria. NYC, at least, seems to undermine P2 of his argument:– There certainly has been some ugly moments where neighborhoods have informally (and illegally) attempted to maintain cultural homogeneity; but– : in the past 100 years, New York has become a reasonably well functioning, multicultural city. There are some group resentments, but it hardly seems like tinderbox ready for ethnic war to explode.– Groups seem to live side by side without much trouble. So if the NYC of 100 years ago is Walzer’s example of what localneighborhoods become when there is an open borders policy, then the price of open borders doesn’t seem too onerous.
P1. It is morally valuable for a country to
to have a distinct culture.
P2. In order for a country to realize a distinct culture it is necessary that the country restrict the quantity and demographic backgrounds of immigrants.
P2. If it is morally valuable for there to be X, then it is morally right to take the necessary means to realize X.
C. It is morally right for a country to restrict
the quantity and demographic backgrounds of immigrants.
Q: Can we turn away those refugeeswho are now in our country seeking asylum?Walzer: not under present conditions.(1) The numbers of asylum seekers is small...so they require little sacrifice from us.(2) Expelling asylum seekers “would require us to use force against helpless and desperate people”.
Q: Since Walzer thinks that having a distinctive culture is of great value, does his view imply that proponents of the White Australia policy were in the right?Walzer: given the vast land and resources Ozcontrolled small population, Oz had two morally acceptable choices:(1) Relax membership to non-white foreigners.(2) Cede territory to foreigners who needed it(i.e. allow other states to form on thealong with it’s comparativelyAustralian subcontinent).Walzer (1983: 46).
Strategy 1: Discover the ultimate moral principle, then apply it to the issue at hand.
Strategy 2: Formulate a compelling (though perhaps not ultimate) moral principle, and apply it to the issue.
(This usually requires also arguing that this principle does not in this case clash with some other principle that is even more compelling.)
Strategy 3: Argument by moral analogy.
•H ighlight an act X that we know to be morally wrong, • Identify the morally relevant features of X. • Show that act Y shares these same features.
Some possible answers: A1: Harm to future human persons. A2: Harm to non-human animals. A3: Harm to living organisms (including plants). A4: Harm to ecosystem(s). A5: Harm to Earth.
HP: Unless there are strong countervailing reasons, it is morally wrong to pursue a policy that can reasonably be expected to harm other persons, even if those persons do not yet exist.
Support for HP?
Hypothetical case: The Prankster’s Bomb with the long fuse.
EOHP: No person could have developed from a different pair of sperm and ovum than the pair she actually developed from.
Parfit suggests that this has a large scale implication:
Suppose economic conditions had been different at some point in the past than they actually were:“We can assume that after two centuries, there would be no one living who would have been born whichever policy we chose.” (Parfit 1983: 13).
No one living 500 years into the future would have been alive if we did not enact the Depletion policy today.So no one could claim to be made worse off by our policy: If we enacted a different policy, they would not have been alive at all!
“Wrongs require victims. Our choice cannot be wrong if we know that it will be worse for no one.” Parfit rejects this principle.
Stipulations:• If she has a child now, it will have quality of life significantly below average.•If she has a child in 10 years, that child will have a Q.O.L. significantly above average.•Doctors determined she will only be able to have one child in her lifetime.
Question:
Is it wrong for the teen to get pregnant now, rather than wait?
Parfit: Yes!
P1. The teen’s act of deliberately becoming pregnant early is wrong.P2. The teen’s act makes no one worse off.P3. If both P1 and P2 are true, then it is false that wrongs require victimsC. It is false that wrongs require victims.
Parfit (1983: 118):
“The objection to our choice [of Depletion] cannot appeal only to effects on those people who will later live. It must mention possible effects on the people who, if we had chosen otherwise, would have later lived.”
(A) It is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived.
Nothing short of the condition of being alive seems to me a plausible and non-arbitrary criterion [of moral considerability].
What is more, this criterion... could admit of application to entities and systems of entities heretofore unimagined as claimants on our moral attention (such as the biosystem itself).”
KP: A thing, x, deserves moral consideration from agents if and only if x is a rational being (i.e., a person)
Objection: Too narrow; it excludes too many things
KP*: A thing, x, deserves moral consideration from agents if and only if x is a rational being (i.e., a person) or x is a potential rational being.
Objection 1: Still too narrow: human beings with severe and permanent disabilities.Objection 2: Potential rationality is not the reason why we should not maltreat babies.
SP: A thing, x, deserves moral consideration from agents if and only if x is capable of suffering pain or feeling pleasure.
P1. x is considerable only if Goodpaster Challenges this premise x has interests.
P2. x has interests only if x is sentient.
P3. Plants and ecosystems are not sentient.
C. Plants and ecosystems are Not considerable.Singer (p.7f):
“The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all... it would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing we can do to it could possibly make any difference to it’s welfare.”
Goodpaster vs. P2: Some non-sentient beings (like plants) have interests!
• A tree has an interest in receiving sun and water, and in not being cut down.
P1. Sentience is an evolved capacity that serves life.P2. If P1 is true, then life is of greater moral importance than sentience.P3. If life is of greater moral importance than sentience, then life is a better criterion for moral considerability than is sentience.C. Life is a better criterion for moral considerability than is sentience
Consequentialism (we’ve looked at utilitarianism as the most famous example): looking forwards, i.e. define an action in terms of its outcomes and ask what outcomes matter morally? How do we choose between alternative actions, based on their outcomes?– Deontology (looking at Kant these two weeks): looking backwards, i.e. define an action in terms of the agent (e.g. intentions, capacities, etc)– (also Virtue theory – not looking at that in this course)
***Normative Ethics of Behaviour:What characteristics make an action morally right (or morally wrong)?****Value Theory:What characteristics make a state of affairs morally good (or morally bad)?Virtue Theory:What characteristics make a person/agent morally virtuous (or morally vicious).
Method One: Intuitionism
Some true ethical principles are self-evident.
(e.g.1) Lying is morally wrong.
Challenge for intuitionism: Disagreement over fundamental ethical principles
Method Two: Empirical FoundationalismTrue ethical principles can be inferred from purely “non-ethical” (e.g. scientific) facts.Premise: Every person desires his or her own happiness.Conclusion: Every person’s happiness is desirable• “Hume’s fork”• “The is/ought gap”• We can’t validly infer an ethical conclusion (an ought)......from a collection of descriptive facts about what *is* actually the case.
The method of reflective equilibrium:Step 1:Gather together all your verdictive ethical beliefs.Step 2:Articulate a general ethical principle that seems to capture the characteristic that all the right/wrong actions have in common.Step 3:Check whether the principle implies that one of your original verdicts is incorrect.
Step 4:Decide which of the clashing beliefs you feel less confident about: the verdict or the principle.
Step 5: Get rid of the weaker belief. If you reject the principle, try revising it so that it no longer clashes.
Step 6:Continue until all clashes are eliminated.
When you succeed, your beliefs are in “reflective equilibrum”.
What is the good outcome and the right way to achieve it?‘The good’ is whatever is to be pursued under that normative theory. So, for utilitarianism, the good was happiness. For Kantian deontology, it was being moral (by following the moral law rather than one’s inclinations). ‘The right’ is the means that the normative theory advocates for pursuing the good. So, for utilitarianism, the right is the pursuit of the net maximisation of the good. For Kant, it was respect for personhood (not using a person as a means to an end) and the categorical imperative.
First, the Divine Law, whereby I mean that Law which God has set to the actions of Men...This is the only true touchstone of moral Rectitude;and by comparing them [i.e., their actions] to this Law, it is, that Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions...”p. 352
From the doctrine of God as the Creator and source of all that is, it follows that a thing is not right simply because we think it is, still less because it seems to be expedient.It is right because God commands it.This means that there is a real distinction between right and wrong which is independent of what we happen to think. It is rooted in the nature and will of God.”
P1. Morality is a kind of law
P2. A law exists only if there is a legislator.
P3. A law exists only if it is enforced by a system of punishment.
P4. The moral law is binding on all rational beings.*
P5. If P1, P2, P3, & P4 are all true, then morality exists only if God exists and legislates and enforces rules concerning human actions.
C. Morality exists only if God exists and legislates and enforces rules concerning human actions
(A) Does God command us to x because x-ing is morally obligatory, !(B) or is x-ing morally obligatory because God commands us to x?!
If B: (i) Godʼs commands are mere caprice.!
(ii) It is trivial to say that God is good and righteous.!
(iii) If God had commanded us to kill indiscriminately, it would be obligatory for us to do so. !
An objection to point (iii):
Point (iii) makes no sense, because God would never command such horrible things.
So we can’t even make sense of the hypothetical scenario.“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”
Sovereignty: If there are moral standards independent of God's will, then "[t]here is something over which God is not sovereign. Omnipotence: These moral standards would limit God's power: not even God could oppose them by commanding what is evil and thereby making it good. Freedom of the will: Moreover, these moral standards would limit God's freedom of will: God could not command anything opposed to them, and perhaps would have no choice but to command in accordance with them.Morality without God: If there are moral standards independent of God, then morality would retain its authority even if God did not exist. On such a view, God is no longer a "law-giver" but at most a "law-transmitter" who plays no vital role in the foundations of morality.
No morality without GodNo reasons for morality: If there is no moral standard other than God's will, then God's commands are arbitraryThe is-ought problem and the naturalistic fallacyGod's goodnessWhy do God's commands obligate?: Mere commands do not create obligations unless the commander has some commanding authority. But this commanding authority cannot itself be based on those very commands (i.e., a command to obey one's own commands), otherwise a vicious circle results.Moral contingency: If morality depends on the perfectly free will of God, morality would lose its necessity: any right action could have easily been wrong, if God had so decidedNo reasons for God: This arbitrariness would also jeopardize God's status as a wise and rational being
P1. If the DCT is true, and if Judeo-Christian Scripture accurately describes God’s commands then every ancient Israelite soldier who refused orders to kill unarmed children acted wrongly.P2. It is not the case that every ancient Israelite soldier who refused orders to kill unarmed children acted wrongly.C. Either DCT is not true or J-C scripture does not accurately describe God’s commands.
CR: an act is morally right if and only if it is permitted by the moral code of the society to which the agent belongs.
Photo card
P1. If CR is true, then Lenny and Gwyneth’s
act of eating a bacon cheeseburger is BOTH morally wrong and not morally wrong.
P2. It it is NOT the case that Lenny and Gwyneth’s act... is both morally wrong and not morally wrong.
C. Therefore, CR is NOT true.
For
a lesser action, the officer was punished, meaning the same actions are now
wrong...only a few decades later. Irrespective of whether either action was
right, how can morality (for the same action) switch like that?
CR seems to put us in a bind. Either:
Slavery was wrong, but only after it ceased (so we have a logical
conflict – at the time CR tells us it is right, afterwards CR tells us it was
wrong at that same point in time); or
We cannot effectively criticise past practices, as the
western society of 1840 is a different culture to the western society of 2012.
P1. If CR is true, then it was morally wrong
of Fauziya to refuse to be excised.
P2. It was NOT morally wrong of Fauziya to refuse to be excised.
C. Therefore, CR is NOT true.
Bentham: Formulation 1.
“By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, accordingtothetendencywhichit appearstohave toaugmentordiminishthe happiness of the party whose interest is in question”
Bentham: Formulation 2.
“An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility... when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.”
Bentham: Formulation 3.
“the greatest happiness of all those whose interests is in question, [is] the...only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action...”
Bentham: Formulation 4.
“...the only right and justifiable end of Government [is] the greatest happiness of the greatest number.”
D1:! ʻThe utility of act xʼ =df! ʻThe total quantity of pain that would result if x was performed! subtracted from!
The total quantity of pleasure that would result, if x was performed.ʼ
D2: ʻact x maximizes utilityʼ =df ʻx produces at least as much utility as any alternative to x.ʼ OR D2ʼ:ʻact x maximizes utilityʼ =df ʻno alternative to x produces a greater amount of utility than x producesʼ
AU: An act, x, is morally right if and only if, x maximizes utility.
Arg 1: ‘right’ just means ‘maximizes utility’ Arg 2: AU is default ethical view: we should make
the world as best as it can be.
Arg 3: AU best explains our intuitions about the rightness of particular acts.
Arg. 4: the concept of morality requires impartiality: we give every individual’s interests equal weight; AU is what you end up with when all interests are weighed equally.
Arg. 5: theoretical simplicity and unity.
P1. If AU is true, then the act of breaking your promise to the castaway is morally right.
P2. It is not the case that the act of breaking your promise to the castaway is morally right.
C. It is not the case that AU is true.
Question: Is it right for the gardener to continue watering his garden, while everyone else has cut down on his or her water use?!On basis of AU, yes it is.
The doctorʼs alternatives:!
Act 1: give the healthy loner a routine checkup, let the five patients die.!
Act 2: !Painlessly kill the loner! Make it look like an accidental death! Donate his organs to the five, thereby saving their lives.!
Photo card
(a) is this pointing out something wrong with AU’s approach to moral reasoning? Or
(b) is this just absurd due to the absurdities of the example – i.e. If real life actually worked in such a way that the particular thought experiment was a common occurrence, would our moral intuitions be different (i.e. In line with what AU suggests?¢If (b) is right, means that a good counter-argument has to show that there is something wrong with AU’s approach, not just that it leads to a bad outcome.
1. Just because an act seen from a particular perspective maximises happiness does not make it the best option e.g. under the spell of religion sacrificing an animal would maximise happiness or great spending for capitalist but these acts are only deemed right because of the cultural context. 2.Ignore intentions: if bad intentions lead to an act that maximised utility it would be deemed good, ignoring the bad intentions all together.3. Act-utilitarianism is too permissive, capable of justifying any crime, and even making it morally obligatory.4. Better in theory than in practice, since we hardly ever have the time and the knowledge to predict the consequences of an act, assess their value, and make comparisons with possible alternative acts.5. Swine: To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit-they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine.'
“[hypothetical imperatives] represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wills (or that is at least possible for one to will).” (Kant 1785: 67)• “...thehypotheticalimperativesaysonlythatanaction is good for some possible or actual purpose.” (ibid. 68)
“Thecategoricalimperativewouldbethatwhich represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end.”• “Acategoricalimperative,whichdeclaresanactionto be of itself objectively necessary without reference to any purpose, that is even apart from any other end, holds as an apodeictically [demonstrable] practical principle.” (Kant 1785: p. 25)
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this:“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”Kant 1785: 73.“The universal imperative of duty may also run as follows:“Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”
“A maxim is the subjective principle of action” • “...[it] contains the practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject acts.
P1. Hedonism Bot’s act of spending New Years in Times Square is morally right.P2. If CI-1 is true, then Hedonism Bot’s act is NOT morally right.C. CI-1 is NOT true.
P1. Ms. Perkins act (even with the new maxim) is NOT morally right.P2. If CI is true, then Ms. Perkin’s act is morally right.C. CI is NOT true.
Perkin’s new maxim:
“When I need a term paper for a course, and I don’t feel like writing one,
and no change in the system will occur if I submit a store-bought one,
then I shall buy a term paper and submit it as my own work.
CI-2: an act, x, is morally right if and only if the agent, in performing x, refrains from treating any person merely as a means.
(P1) If people are not ends in themselves, then nothing is an end in itself.
(P2) If nothing is an end in itself, then there is never any reason to act one way rather than in another.
(P3) There is sometimes a reason to act in one way rather than in another.
(C) People are ends in themselves.